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Abstract The periodic table may be seen as the most successful example of inquiry in the
history of science, both in terms of practical application and theoretic understanding. As
such, it serves as a model for truth as it emerges from inquiry. This paper offers a sketch of
a central moment in the history of chemistry that illustrates an intuitive metamathematical
construction, a model of emerging truth (MET). The MET, reflecting the structure the
surrounds the periodic table, attempts to capture the salient epistemological elements that
warrant truth claims based on sets of models that are progressive in light of both empirical
and theoretical advance seen over time.
Keywords
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Part I: purpose and context
This paper is philosophical in its intent. Its purpose is to illustrate a metamathematical
model of truth as emerging from inquiry. The insight that drives the model is the realization that any simple notion of truth as correspondence is not a possible theory of truth as
it emerges from the sorts of inquiry characteristic of the physical sciences. We did not, as
science progressed, nor do we now, have the world to compare to our evolving theories, for
it is only through our theories and the observations that they imply that the contours of the
world becomes available to us. Yet the ultimate virtue of scientific inquiry is that it seeks
truth in just the sense that the intuition of truth as correspondence to reality requires. We
want science to be about the world as it truly is, as in the Peircean aphorism: ‘‘the ideal
limit to which endless investigations would tend’’ (Hartshorne and Weiss 1960, 5.565).
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Given the philosophical purpose, the paper does not address the periodic table as an
object of inquiry; it is not intended as a contribution to the study of the table and relies
heavily on a well-informed description of its history, now available in the work of Eric R.
Scerri (2007). For the purposes of the discussion here, the table is taken as a paradigmatic
instance of successful science; characterized by increasingly adequate empirical descriptions and including compelling explanations of exceptional range and utility. A precedent
for the use I make of the table can be seen at crucial instances in the history of philosophy.
Classic examples include Newtonian physics in Kant’s epistemology, Hume’s use of the
broadly inductive science of his day, Aristotle’s concern with living things and the taxonomic structure of syllogism, and geometry for Plato. Each of these scientific projects
could be seen as constituting the best theoretic knowledge available at a time and each
would be used to produce deep logical and epistemological metaphors, metaphors that both
generate and support philosophical ideas. From such a perspective, the periodic table and
the range of theories it coordinates is more than a scientific success, it is a telling exemplification of inquiry at its best. And as such may be productive of deep logical and
philosophical insights as regards truth in both its epistemological and ontological guises.
The core contribution of the paper is a metamathematical model of emerging truth
(MET) that offers a constructive vision of how the process of seeking truth can be
understood, elaborating the logical conditions that result in truth emerging (Weinstein
2013). It supports truth in the strong sense of ontological commitment, while displaying
essential epistemological criteria defined in terms of increasingly adequate sequences of
models of two essentially different logical types. The two logical types, distinguishing
empirical evidence from transformative theory, ultimately yield a surrogate for correspondence: what is to be ultimately seen as true (or as close to true as anyone could
reasonably require). Truth is reconceptualized in terms of a logical structure viewed over
time that yields increasing epistemological warrant as inquiry progresses while transforming the understanding of the content of the inquiry itself. It is the logical detail of the
essential supporting structure along with the intuitive epistemological notions the structure
exemplifies that is the contribution of the MET. It stands as independent of the periodic
table as an image of truth-yielding inquiry. But it captures what I see as essential to the
scientific structure that has the table at its center: the set of complex relationships among
the range of theories and models that constitute physical chemistry as it is evolving.
The construction of the MET embodies two deep logical properties that I see to be at the
basis of the epistemic power of the periodic table, increasingly evident as the project in
support of the table progressed. First, the selection of empirical evidence during the course
of its elaboration and second, the construction of plausible explanatory models in light of
prevailing trends in data and often in disregard of anomalies. The purpose of the metamathematics is to give logical substance to these essential outcomes of scientific inquiry in
order to expose the epistemological force of successful science. The MET gives logical
content to three normatively compelling epistemological features of scientific advance:
consilience, increase of the empirical basis over time, breadth, the range of application of a
theory and depth, the degree of theoretic grounding in underlying theories. Depth as
articulated in the MET affords a qualitative shift in explanatory adequacy that over time
leads to a broader range of explanations and greater consilience (e.g. more adequate
empirical models, a finer gradient of description and more precise measurements).
The MET, like previous rational reconstructions of scientific theories, is an ideal type in
two regards, describing an ideal end achieved and being an idealization of the process
through which the final goal is reached. The complexity of the construction shows that a
complex logical structure is required if we are to capture even the most idealized image of
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how science makes progress. The MET is projective, it indicates how in prospect, a theory
that will ultimately be proved true will look. The perspective the MET affords permits core
elements that, in retrospect, could be seen as indications of the theories ultimate success
and thus affords intimations for the future. So, in light of the enormous success of the
table as the cornerstone of physical chemistry, I look at the history of its developments as
an object lesson on how inquiry looks when it is doing as well as one could reasonable
hope for. The purpose of the historical sketch is to reference aspects of the MET, which
will then be presented in the final section of the paper. As forbidding as the metamathematical construction may be for students of the foundations of chemistry, my hope is that
the historical account will motivate readers to engage with the MET as a useful synoptic
image of physical chemistry as an ideal type.

Part II: the MET applied
Our starting point is the core postulate of John Dalton: ‘‘the weights of atoms would serve
as a kind of bridge between the realm of microscopic unobservable atoms and the world of
observable properties’’ (Scerri 2007, p. 34). This was the essential joining of a metaphysical position with the core of methodological revolution by Lavoisier who took
weighing residual elements after chemical decomposition as the primary source of data.
Dalton maintained that such decomposition resulted in identifiable atoms, a reconstitution
of the ancient idea of elements, now transformed from ordinary substances to elements that
were the result of chemical decomposition. Studies of a range of gases, by 1805, yielded a
table of atomic and molecular weights that supported the ‘‘long recognized law of constant
proportions…when any two elements combine together, for example, hydrogen and oxygen, they always do so in a constant ratio of their masses’’ (ibid., p. 35–36). The period
beginning as early as the last decade of the eighteenth century is characterized by identifying meaningful quantitative relationships among the elements as epitomized by Benjamin Richter who published a table of equivalent weights. Continuing inquiry yielded
both the possibility of increasing precision and opened theoretic descriptions to all of the
vagaries of empirical measurements: open to the full problematic of weakly supported
theories, new and developing procedures of measurement, and the complex nature of the
measurement process itself—measures that were open to change and refinement as techniques were improved and experimenters gained more experience (ibid., p. 29ff).
The history of the attempt to experimentally ascertain quantitative relations identified as
atomic or molecular weights exemplifies a number of aspects that are at the core of the
MET and its rational reconstruction of physical inquiry. The essential logical distinction is
between the concrete exemplification of a theoretic perspective in a series of models, each
one representing some empirical data, and the grounding of these models in a theoretic
perspective that speaks to the possibility of a fundamental reinterpretation of the phenomena (MET, 1.1, 1.1.2). In this case the metaphysical commitment to atomism as the
impetus for the experimental attempt to ascertain quantitative relations among chemical
elements.
The tension between theoretic expectation and experimental outcomes results in an
essential methodological posture, often overlooked in philosophical accounts of scientific
inquiry. Even a cursory look at the history of physical chemistry identifies a key pragmatic
element that has profound epistemological consequences. Approximations to theoretic
expectations must be tolerated as inquiry advances and decisions in the face of empirical
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inadequacy are disciplined by prevailing standards that even if under dispute, place constraints on which approximations are taken seriously (MET. 1.1.3). These epistemological
and pragmatic elements are built into the basic logical construction (MET, 1, e). Such
pragmatic decisions must, however, be managed, and it is a major contribution of the MET
that the management of approximations can be identified with a logically coherent posture,
the core concept of a sequence of models that are progressive, that is increasingly adequate
of time (MET, 2–2.2.2). This is the key notion of consilience, increasing empirical adequacy over time (MET 2.3.1). But empirical adequacy is only one aspect of the success of
physical chemistry. As important is the idea of breadth, the scope of the inquiry (MET,
2.3.2). But from the perspective of physical chemistry, seen with the periodic table at its
center, the key indicator of epistemic adequacy is depth, the potential for profound theoretic understanding (MET, 3.1).
The distinction between a deep theoretic intuition and the development of related
empirical results captures an essential logical distinction that forms the basis of the MET,
the idea of a scientific structure consisting of a theory, first identified in terms of its
empirical models and then reinterpreted in terms of additional models generated by higher
order theories (MET, 1). The development of empirical models, sets of data unified through
a methodological perspective must be contrasted with deep theoretical intuitions, the
abstract models that underlie a sense of the deep structures that the data may be seen to
exemplify. Theoretic models may have little empirical purchase at the beginning of
inquiry, but have great potential epistemic power. For unlike empirical models of a theory
they furnish the possibility of a unified interpretation of the data and if successful, generate
the potential for enormous theoretical depth with the concomitant enormous yield in
additional information, much of which barely imaginable as an extrapolation from the
available empirical models. As we shall see as we trace a central thread in the development
of the periodical table through the lens of the MET, the logical distinction between the two
sorts of models is essential for understanding the power of the table as the core element in
the most successful explanatory structure in the history of science. Physical science
exemplifies human inquiry by its very best and so understanding the logic of inquiry in its
terms offers a window on the most essential epistemological and metaphysical questions:
what does truth look like when we achieve it, and how does truth achieved inform of us as
to the nature of reality? An answer to these questions is found in the constructions that the
MET provides. It can be evidenced by a central moment in the history of chemistry.
The early attempts to develop the empirical basis for what was to be the periodic
table were characterized by experimental ambiguity. The lack of clear empirical data
consistent with the intuition encapsulating in the requirement of constant proportions was
more than problems of measurement or other technical issues. In hindsight many of the
problems that confronted the chemists reflected a conceptual issue expressed in experimental incongruities. Atomic weight is not invariably reflected in equivalent weight and so
the underlying structure was not readily ascertained by finding equivalent weights, the core
empirical tool. For without knowing the correct chemical formula, there is no way to
coordinate the correct proportions against the observed measurements of the weight of
component elements in ordinary occurring chemical compounds. And as it turns out, ‘‘the
question of finding the right formula for compounds was only conclusively resolved a good
deal later when the concept of valency, the combining power of particular elements was
clarified by chemists in the decade that followed by Edward Frankland and Auguste
Kekulé working separately’’ (ibid., p. 37).
The initial problems, including Dalton’s infamous mistaken formula for water, were the
result of empirical incongruities seen in light of a core integrating hypothesis: the law of
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definite proportion by volume, expressed in 1809 by Guy Lusac as, ‘‘the volume of gases
entering into a chemical reaction and the gaseous products are in a ratio of small integers’’
(ibid.). Held as almost a regulative principle, the law was confronted with countless
counterexamples, recalcitrant, yet often roughly accurate, measurements reflected the lack
of knowledge of the time. A common occurrence throughout the history of science, early
chemistry reflects the competing pull of empirical adequacy and theoretic clarity. Not one
to the exclusion of the other, but both in an uneasy balance.
This tension was reflected in many disputes; but the dispute that reflects the deepest
thread running through the history of the periodic table, is the trajectory of Prout’s
hypothesis. Scerri identifies the key insight, the rather remarkable fact that, ‘‘many of the
equivalent weights and atomic weights appeared to be approximately whole number
multiples of the weights of hydrogen’’ (ibid., p. 38). This was based on the increasing
numbers of tables of atomic weights available in the first decades of the nineteenth century.
But it was not merely increasing data that drove the science. The two poles, not surprisingly, were the attempts to offer empirically adequate descriptions that demonstrate sufficient structural integrity seen in light of underlying theoretic assumptions, and
exemplified in the law of definite proportions. In the terms of the MET, experimental
results were expected to offer empirical models or near models consistent with the theory
that required measurements to exhibit integer ratios, in practice, decimals close to integers
(the closer the better). Prout’s hypothesis, that elements are composed of hydrogen, first
indicated in an anonymous publication in 1819, offered a deeply unifying insight: if
everything was composed of one element, the law of definite proportions was an immediate
corollary. The bold hypothesis was based on ‘‘rounding off’’ empirical values of the
comparative weights of elements as an index of the atomic weights, to whole number
multiples of 1, the presumed atomic weight of hydrogen. The available data created
roadblocks. In 1825, the noted chemist Jacob Berzelius, ‘‘compiled a set of improved
atomic weights that disproved Prout’s hypothesis’’ (ibid., p. 40). Prout’s hypothesis,
however, whatever its empirical difficulties, ‘‘proved to be very fruitful because it
encouraged the determination of accurate atomic weights by numerous chemists who were
trying to either confirm or refute it’’ (ibid., p. 42).
But there was more to the story. It was not only empirical results that drove the inquiry.
Theoretic coherence played an increasingly powerful role. Both empirical adequacy and
theoretic coherence were made possible by the quantitative paradigm that resulted from the
centrality of weighing associated with Lavoisier. Quantitative relationships have an
essential yield beyond the increased ability to offer precise descriptions that may be
subjected to increasingly stringent empirical testing. They are also open to structural
interpretations. Available chemical experiments quickly began to generate data that
afforded systematization, which was a prelude to eventual theoretic adequacy. The first
effort to systematize known empirical results can be attributed to the German chemist
Johann Döbereiner, who in 1817 constructed triples of elements which showed chemical
affinities, and most essentially, showed ‘‘an important numerical relationship, namely, that
the equivalent weight, or atomic weight of the middle is the approximate mean of the
values of the two flanking elements in the triad’’ (ibid., p. 42). This moved the focus from
constructing tables of atomic weights to looking more closely at the relationships among
known values. It led to an initial structural unification of the table of elements through the
identification of more triads, triples of elements that show clear ratios between their
equivalent weights and therefore their presumed atomic weights. Other chemists, notably
Max Pettenkofer and Peter Kremers, worked with similar constructions, which culminated
in Ernst Lensser fitting all 58 known elements into a structure of 20 triads. But the problem
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of ascertaining atomic weights still resulted in competing values and contrasting constructions. By 1843, a precursor to the periodic table was published by Leopold Gmelin, a
system that combined some 53 elements in an array that reflected both chemical and
mathematical properties, and organized most known elements in groups that would later be
seen to reflect the underlying principles of the periodic table. This work was purely
empirical and not linked to Prout’s hypothesis in any clear way. But this was not because
of a deficiency in the underlying theory.
The problem of understanding the available data, in the absence of an adequate theory
of the evidence, was at the heart of the issue confounding the early structural models begun
with the identification of triads. It was only after the famous hypothesis of Amadeo
Avogadro in 1811, which fixed the relationship between a volume of gas and its constituent
atoms or molecules, was championed by Stanislao Cannizzaro in the midcentury, that
chemists had a firm enough footing to develop increasingly adequate measurements of
atomic weight and to begin to see the shape of the underlying relationships in increasingly
rich structural accounts. That is to say, Prout’s theory, although substantially correct was
not confirmed by the available evidence, and would not be until the subsidiary theories
needed to make sense of the growing body of empirical evidence were articulated. The first
step was the acceptance of the mathematical account of atomic weight (Avogadro’s
number). There would be more to follow.
Scerri concludes, ‘‘It is rather surprising that both Prout’s hypothesis and the notion of
triads are essentially correct and appeared problematic only because the early researchers
were working with the wrong data’’ (ibid., p. 61). But I would add, not empirically wrong
by the observational standards of the day, but rather misinterpreted because of the lack of
adequate theory. Prout is, of course, correct in seeing hydrogen as the basis of the elements,
since hydrogen with one proton serves as the basic structural element as we move across
the periodic table of elements, each element adding protons in whole number ratios based
on hydrogen with one proton. The number of protons yields the final organizational
principle of the table. The ambiguity would continue; structural relations among elements
remained equivocal until atomic number was distinguished from atomic weight; atomic
number includes the contribution from neutrons, which were unknown until the mid
twentieth century.
The increase in triads and similar structural accounts is an example of how a position is
sustained in the face of competing evidence. The available evidence is reconstructed in
models, which are increasingly fruitful over time. The empirical evidence, its models,
forms a sequence of models, presented, discussed and elaborated over time. In terms of the
MET there is a function that maps the hypothesis onto a set of models (or near models)
(MET, 2), and the model chain is progressive, that is, the set of models is increasing over
time (MET, 2.2.1). This affords the dialectical force to resist counterexamples. Anomalous
models, rather then requiring rejection of the theory calls for an adjudication of the power
of the counterexample against the weight of the models of the theory, its breadth of
application, and the range of its empirical support. Both the empirical result and the theory
stand in an uneasy tension, but they both stand. We do not reject the counterexample,
rather we moderate its dialectical force. The issue can be formally addressed through the
MET, which yields a hierarchy of warrant strength and principles for determining relative
dialectical power (Weinstein 2013, chapter 4 develops a metric using adaptive logic).
The MET requires a number of assumptions about the models in the formal elaboration
that then must be exemplified in the historic practice of inquiry. The first is the assumption
that models can be ordered, and the second that approximation relationships can be defined
that support the ordering. The latter is crucial, approximation relations (technically
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neighborhood relations on a field of sets) enable complex relationships among evidence of
all sorts to be defined. Intuitively, approximation relations are seen in terms of various
indices of the goodness of fit between the evidence and the model, in respect to the terms
and relationships expressed in a generalization. The practice is subject to debate, but is no
mere sociological construct since there is an epistemological requirement. The model chain
must prove to be progressive, the chain of models must be increasing and be increasingly
better approximations over time (MET, 2.3).
This is evident in the history of the periodic table. By the 1860 s the discovery of triads
had moved further into the beginnings of the periodic system. By the 1880 s a number of
individuals could be credited with beginning a systematization of the elements. Scerri, in
addition to Dimitri Mendeleev and Julius Lothar Meyer, credits Alexendre De Chancourtois and John Newlands, William Odling and Gustavus Hinrichs.
Systematization had been made possible by the improved methods for determining
atomic weights (Cannizzaro and others) and a clear distinction between molecular and
atomic weight. As Scerri puts it, ‘‘the relative weight of the known elements could be
compared in a reliable manner, although a number of these values were still incorrect and
would be corrected only by the discovery of the periodic system’’ (ibid., p. 67). Systematization was supported by the discovery of a number of new elements that fit within the
preliminary organizing structures, and the focus was moved towards experimental outcomes without much concern for the theoretic pressure of Prout’s hypothesis, which fell
out of favor as an organizing principle as the idea of simple arithmetic relationships among
the elements proved harder to sustain in the light of a growing body of empirical evidence.
From the point of view of my construction, what was persuasive was the availability of
model chains that, in and of themselves were progressive (MET, 2.2.1). Series of models
could be connected though approximation relations despite the lack of an underlying and
unifying hypotheses. And whatever the details of goodness of fit, at this point in the history
of the development of the periodic table the structure took precedence over both deep
theory (Prout’s hypothesis) in the name of network of models connected by reasonably
clear if evolving, quantitative and chemical (structural) relationships.
The apparent, and temporary, rejection of Prout’s hypothesis at this juncture, despite its
role as encapsulating the fundamental intuition behind the search for quantitative relationships, offers a window into what a theory of emerging truth requires. In the standard
model of, for example, Karl Popper, counterexamples force the rejection of the underlying
hypothesis. But as often, the counterexample is accepted, but the hypothesis persists,
continuing as the basis for the search for theoretic relationships. The intuition that
prompted the search for a unifying structure, in terms of which the mathematical and
chemical properties of the elements could be organized and displayed, was sustained in the
light of countervailing empirical evidence. Making sense of this requires a more flexible
logic, one that permits a preliminary focus on a subset of the properties and relations within
of a model (the source of the anomaly), while sustaining the set of models deemed
adequate in the larger sense exhibited by the connections among models in a unifying
theoretical structure. This is the point of the defining reduction in terms of subsets of the
reduced theory, increasingly captured by the reducing theory (MET, 3.1). And as the
century progressed, the search for such a structure that could be interpreted in terms of the
developing atomic theory began to bear fruit.
By the turn of the century, the core intuition, combining chemical affinities and
mathematical measurements, resulted in a number of proposals that pointed towards the
periodic table. John Newland introduced the idea of structural level with his ‘‘law of
octaves.’’ The geologist, Alexander De Chancourtois, and chemists William Odling and
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Gustavus Hinrichs offered structural accounts of know elements. All this culminated in the
work of Lothar Meyer and most famously Dimitri Mendeleev, who are credited as the key
progenitors of the periodic table of elements. The proliferation of structured arrays of
models reflected the key epistemic property I call ‘‘model chain progressive’’ (MET, 2.3).
These complexes of known chemical properties were refined and ultimately reduced by a
number of microphysical theories as the understanding of particle physics grew. But at the
turn of the century, it was the models of known chemical elements (data sets of measurements, formula of chemical reactions, graphic images and structural arrays) that were
being linked in an expanding array, such that the set of model chains was itself increasing
both in number and in empirical adequacy. Hence the model chain could be seen as
progressive. Chemistry was moving forward, as empirical evidence and structural models
increased in accuracy, coherence, and number.
The culmination was a series of publications by Mendeleev beginning in 1869, which
codified and refined his version of the periodic table in various editions of his textbook, The
Principles of Chemistry, which by 1891 was available in French, German, and English.
Mendeleev encapsulated his findings in eight points:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

The elements if arranged according to their atomic weights, exhibit periodicity of
properties
Elements that are similar as regards their chemical properties have atomic weights,
which are either of nearly the same values…
The arrangements of the elements, or of groups of elements, the order of their atomic
weights corresponds to their so-called valences…
The elements that are most widely diffused have small atomic weights.
The magnitude of the atomic weight determines the character of the elements, just as
the magnitude of the molecule determines the character of the compound body.
We must expect the discovery of many yet unknown elements, for example elements
analogous to aluminum and silicon whose weights should be between 65 and 71.
The atomic weight of an element may be sometimes be amended by a knowledge of
those contiguous elements.
Certain characteristic properties of the elements can be foretold from their atomic
weights (all italics original, ibid., pp. 109–110).

Mendeleev’s conjectures led to a number of compelling predications of unknown elements based on gaps in the table (item 6). This is generally thought to be the most
significant factor in its acceptance. Scerri maintains, and I concur, that of equal importance
was the accommodations to accepted data that the system afforded (item 7). A major
contribution is the correction of atomic weights due to the realization of the importance of
valence (item 3). Atomic weight was not identical with equivalent weight only, but rather
reflected the product of equivalent weight and valence (ibid., p. 126). This was reflected by
the increase in accuracy as the power of the notion of periodicity in guiding subsequent
empirical research proved invaluable (item 1) as well as in the emerging connections
between chemical and mathematical properties (items 2, 5 and 8). Even more important to
the development of physical chemistry was the effect of the system on later developments
in the microphysics, which developed in part, as an explanatory platform upon which the
table could stand. These are all powerful considerations in accounting for the general
acceptance of the periodic table in the twentieth century. The last of these, indicated almost
in passing in item 4, points us back to the ultimate reinterpretation and vindication of
Prout’s hypotheses. For it is hydrogen with an atomic weight of 1.00794 that moves us to
the next stage in my model, the role of reduction as the harbinger of truth in science.
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Beginning with the discovery of the electron by J.J. Thompson in 1897, the early
decades of the twentieth century showed enormous progress in the elaboration and
understanding of the nature of atoms. Ernest Rutherford, Wilhelm Rontgen, Henri Poincare, Henri Becquerel, Marie Curie, Anton van den Broek, Alfred Mayer and Henry
Moseley all contributed empirical and theoretical insights that led of a deeper understanding of atomic structure and its relation to the chemical and mathematical properties of
the known elements, as well as the discovery of additional elements, all within the structure
the periodic table provided.
The availability of a micro theory that explained known empirical data and made
predictions in a principled way, pointed to the availability of the periodic table as a
candidate for deep theoretic reduction. The chemical elements could be reinterpreted in
terms of a theoretic domain of objects based on the developing notions of the atom and
especially of the electron (MET, 3-3.1). Early accounts of the elements in terms of electron
configurations where constructed by Gilbert Lewis, Irving Langmuir, Charles Bury, and
John Main Smith. That is to say the micro theory became reduction progressive, ultimately
to yield microphysics as a progressively branching reducers, as it reduced domain after
domain in physical theory (MET, 3.2–3.4). But that is to get ahead of our story. For the
construction of microphysics was a long and complex process.
All of these early efforts were objects of contention and none was adequate to available
empirical evidence; but the power of the theoretic idea prevailed despite empirical difficulties and despite the lack of a firm grounding in a clear theoretic account of the
underlying physics. This was to be changed by the seminal work of Neil Bohr and Max
Plank, along with many others including most notably Wolfgang Pauli, which led to
quantum mechanics based on the matrix mathematics of Werner Heisenberg, the empirical
and theoretical work of Douglass Hartree and Vladimer Fock, and the essential work of
Louis de Broglie, Erwin Schrodinger and Wolfgang Pauling. In my terms the periodic
table had become the linchpin that supported and area of theories that were reduction
progressive (MET, 3.2). Moreover, the elaboration of the underlying theory was itself
becoming increasingly adequate both in terms of its empirical yield as reflected in better
measurements, and in a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomena that it
reduced: the chemical and mathematical properties identified in the periodic table of
elements. Microphysics was itself progressive in a number of dimensions (MET, 2.2.1, 2.3,
3.1). But as always, the theoretic advance was in the face of empirical difficulties. At no
time in the development of quantum theory was there an easy accommodation between
empirical fact and theoretic coherence. The various theories all worked against anomalous
facts and theoretic inconsistencies. And although this was the subject of ongoing debate,
the larger issue was driven by the coherence of the project as evidenced by the increasing
availability of partially adequate models, and intellectually satisfying accounts that initiated the enormous increase of chemical knowledge that characterizes the last century.
The power of the periodic table was not fully displayed until the reduction to a reasonably clear micro-theory led to the enormous increase in breadth that characterized the
chemical explanations for the vast array of substances and processes, ranging from the
electro-chemistry of the cell to crystallography, from transistors to cosmology. This is
captured in the MET by the notion of a branching reducer (3.3). It is simple fact, although
seemingly hyperbolic, that the entire mastery of the physical world evidenced by the
breadth of practical applications in modern times rests on the periodic table. That is,
quantum physics through its application to the periodic table is a progressively branching
reducer (MET, 3.4).
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But the issue of ontology remains open (MET 4. 1). The periodic table, resting upon an
increasingly elaborate microphysics is still a work in progress. For quantum mechanics
itself has been deepened with the increasingly profound theories of particle physics. This is
an area of deep theoretical and even philosophical contention and so the impact of highest
level reducing theories remains obscure. It is possible that reducing theories will point to
major revisions and that the ultimate goal of the MET (5.3.2) will remain elusive. Given
the power of the structure that the periodic table supports, an alternative microphysics
would need to reconstitute the array of integrated physical science with effective reinterpretations. The daunting nature of such a task points to the epistemic force of the table as
the keystone around which the edifice of physical chemistry is built.

Part III: the model of emerging truth (MET)
Despite the attempt at rigor through the use of formalism, the MET is a metaphor. The
purpose is to use simple formal descriptions to trace in bold outlines the underlying logical
structure. It is a logical structure, however, that is closely tied to a normative agenda. The
MET strives to both exhibit patterns of relationships within scientific structures and to
reflect central philosophical intuitions about truth. My guiding intuition is that the model
for truth in inquiry should be drawn from a paradigmatic example of the most adequate
inquiry available. And so there is an essential historical (naturalistic) aspect. Nevertheless,
as a philosophical account, the MET must meet philosophical demands. The formalism is
intended to afford noetic clarity. Metamathematical descriptions through their transparency
and synoptic capacity are employed so that the meaning of essential epistemological
concepts is explicit and available for scrutiny.
1. Scientific structures:
We define a scientific structure as an ordered triple, TT = hT, FF, RRi, with or without
indices, primes, asterisks, etc., where: T is a set of sentences that constitute the linguistic
statement of TT. The set T is closed under a consequence relation constructed to preclude
manifest irrelevancies Cone, where Cone(T) = {s: T|-e s} such that:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

Tc implies s,
Tc does not imply not-s,
for some tci in Tc, tci is a nomic generalization,
for any tci in Tc, neither tci implies s, nor s implies tci,
there is no sequence Tc of sentences r1,…,rk, available within the set of sentences
accepted by the discourse community that accepts T, such that, for some sequence of
tc1,…, tcj in Tc
i.
ii.
iii.

tc1,…,tcj implies r1&,…,&rk,
r1,…,rk does not imply tc1&,…,&tcj,
upon replacing tc1,…,tcj in Tc by r1,…,rk, denoting by ‘Tcr,’ Tcr implies s.

Since T is a scientific theory among the set of consequences are some empirical statements,
where, for empirical statement, ses, where, f(ses) = mem, for some f in F and F in FF, f,
assigns to ses a set of data in some empirical model, mem.
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1.1. FF is a field (a structured family) of sets of functions F, such that for all F in FF, and
f in F, f(T) = m for some model, m, where either:
i.
ii.

m||- T, or
m is a near isomorph of some model n, and n||- T.

FF is closed under set theoretic union, for all sets of functions X and Y, if X and Y are in
FF, so is X[Y.
1.1.2. RR is a field of sets of functions, R, such that for all R in RR and every, r, in R,
there is some theory T* and r represents T in T*, in respect of some subset of T, k(T). The
intuition is that the structure of k(T) is preserved under the replacement of variables of T
with variables from T*. The logical properties of representing functions are discussed in
Weinstein (2013, chapter 3, pp. 88ff.) RR is closed under set theoretic union as well.
The structure of the field groups functions into sets that represent particular lines of
inquiry. Sets of sets represent lines of inquiry that coalesce. What goes where is extralogical. Lines of inquiry are exemplified in practice including individual and institutional
decisions that link various independent lines of inquiry in particular research programs.
The rational reconstruction of science in the abstract sense intended here is thus parasitic
upon the historical and methodological analysis of actual scientific inquiry. But for the
purposes of the MET, all that is needed is the abstract capability of keeping track of things,
whence, fields, sets of sets of functions.
1.1.3. By ‘‘near isomorph’’ we mean that model, m, is in some appropriate approximation to the isomorphism relation with, n, a model of T. The notion of approximation is
parasitic on the availability of definable approximation relations, general in respect of a
range of possibilities. The clearest examples of definable approximation relations are
arithmetic models that afford measures of data at a definable distance from the requirements of the intended model: the consequences of the generalizations constitutive of T. But
approximations can also be idealizations or simplifications as in diagrams, and with ‘‘near
isomorph’’ being a measure of the essential properties of the idealization as against a
complete diagram of the phenomena in theoretic terms.
By ‘‘appropriate’’ we indicate the essential pragmatic turn, we intend a level of
approximation consistent with the practices of the scientific discourse frame within which
TT is sustained. For example, how different from the theoretic ideal a model of a data set
may be while still counting as an instance of the theory (confirmation in the standard
account). The notion of appropriateness is a posteriori, and we refrain from any attempt to
legislate, a priori, what such appropriate approximations should be. We protect against
theoretic license by placing a demand on the progress of such models (2 and 2.2.1 below).
1.2. With Cone(T) as {s: T|-e s} if k(T) = Cone(T) then T*redT, for some reduction
relation red, such that T reduces to T* in the sense there is an effective representing
function, r, such that, r, represents T in T* in respect of the consequences of T under ‘‘|-e’’
for some function in the set of functions R* in RR* for TT*.
1.2.1. This enables us to generate a family of weaker reductions where, as before,
k(T) = Cone(k(T)) for some proper subset Cone(k(T)) of Cone(T). It is the ordering of such
weaker notions over time that points to the progressive nature of a theory, as we shall see in
2 through 2.3.2, below.
1.2.2. Let T*redT, then for any model m* of T* there is some model m of T such that,
for all sentences t in T (and some t* of T*) m||- t if and only if m*||- r(t) where r(t) = t*
under the assignments of the members of R.
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If T*redT, we add to the set F of functions for T in TT, functions f* in F* such that
f*(T) = m* for some m* in M* in a realization of T* of TT*. We include in TT all
functions that define models of the reducing theory T* compatible with some models of T
in TT. Notice that the extension is consistent if the set of models under functions in FF and
FF* are consistent.
1.2.3. We call a model, m* a reduction model for T; the set O of models m*, such that
for functions f* in F*; f*(T) = m*, is called the ontic set of T.
1.3. Before we begin a more detailed examination of the elements of TT, a word about
the governing intuition. A scientific structure in the sense of TT, is first of all a set of
sentences, T. These are the commitments of the members of the field in respect of a given
body of inquiry. We then include a class of possible models (or appropriately approximate
models) and a set of reducing theories (or near reducers). What we will be interested in
here is a realization of TT, that is to say, a triple hT, F, Ri where F and R represent choices
from FF and RR, respectively. What we look at is the history of realizations, that is, an
ordered n-tuple: hh T, F1, R1i,…,h T, Fn, Rnii ordered in time. The claim is that the
adequacy of TT as a scientific structure is a complex function of the set of realizations.
The notion of a realization is a core pragmatic element in the construction of MET, we
are not interested in all possible models, or even all actual models. We are only interested
in the models that are put forward in inquiry, that is to say, the bodies of evidence, both
empirical and theoretical that are put forward by those engaged in the inquiry. This point of
view is less familiar in formal philosophy of science based as it was in the past on a logical
model drawn from the study of foundations of mathematics. In mathematics one deals with
necessities and so all possible models are of concern. In science one attempts to construct
selected models that reflect the empirical realities as known, as well as conjectures about
yet to be found empirical models. And we shall see, and essential to the power of physical
chemistry, was the construction of theoretic models that through their fecundity prove
adequate to emerging realties that the theoretic models could both anticipate and explain. It
is such intended models, theoretic constructs that commit the theory to a vision of the
world that it strives to explain, that are the logical core of the constructions that follow.
1.3.1. The construction of realizations, the choice sets of elements, reflect actual
practice within a discourse frame, the set of realizations, and the constructions defined
through them, are normative in respect of practice. Central epistemological and ontological
concepts, in light of which judgments of the adequacy of TT will be made, are independent
of the judgments of members of the discourse frame. That is, TT need not be consciously
available to users of TT, nor need they explicitly make epistemological or ontological
judgments in light of the set of realizations. The adequacy of meta-judgments in respect of
TT, is a function of the plausibility of the normative constructs that the set of realizations
permit us to see. My claim is that the adequacy of TT as a scientific structure is a complex
function of the set of realizations. Although grounded in actual judgments, epistemic
adequacy is a function of the objective facts of emerging theoretic understanding and the
empirical adequacy, which adequate theory requires and supports. Ascertaining epistemic
adequacy in this sense is a classic goal of philosophy of science, and reflects the careful
work of more historically oriented scholars who look beyond sociology and towards
normative accounts.
2. Let T* be a subtheory of T in the sense that T* is the restriction of the relational
symbols of T to some sub-set of these. Let f* be subset of some f in F, in some realization
of TT. Let hT*1,…,T*ni be an ordered n-tuple such that for each i,j (i \ j), T*i reflects a
subset of T modeled under some f* at some time earlier than T*j. We say the T is model
progressive under f* iff:
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T*k is identical to T for all indices k, or
the ordered n-tuple hT*1,…,T*ni is well ordered in time by the subset relation.
That is to say, for each T*i, T*j in hT*1,…,T*ni (i \ j C 2), if T*i is earlier in time
than T*j, T*i is a proper subset of T*j.

In this condition, and in all those to follow we assume that both i and j are greater than 1
and less than or equal to n, that is to say, there is more than one member of the sequence
and the sequence is finite. That there are at least some models of some aspects of the theory
is a condition met by most of physical science and all of physical science that can be
usefully employed. That there be at least a number of such is required if the progress of a
theory is to be ascertained. I use elementary set theoretic constructions, and rely on the
subset relation as an ideal type; although the realities undoubtedly require much more
complex statistical constructions. We cannot assume that all theoretic advances are progressive. Frequently, theories move backwards without being, thereby, rejected. An
obvious example of this is the empirical difficulties that faced the law of definite proportion
by volume, held as a regulative principle despite much available evidence to the contrary.
So, in determining epistemic force we look for a preponderance of evidence as it accumulates over time. This cannot be defined a priori. What counts as an advance is a
judgment in respect of a particular enterprise as it moves forward in light of the implicit
normative criteria exemplified by the standards of practice of those engaged with the
theory, an essential pragmatic turn if we are to understand how actual inquiry functions.
2.2. We define a model chain C, for theory, T, as an ordered n-tuple hm1,…,mni, such
that for each mi in the chain mi = hdi, fii for some domain di, and assignment function fi,
and where for each i and j (i \ j), mi is an earlier realization (in time) of T then mj.
Intuitively, a model chain is a sequence of models part forward about a subject matter,
ordered in time. Again, we limit the models under consideration to actual models put
forward in the course of inquiry. We are not looking for the full range of set theoretic
equivalences but rather limited our purview to evaluating explanations and explanatory
models put forward in light of defensible standards prevailing within an inquiry process.
2.2.1. Let m* be an intended model of T, making sure that f(T) = m* for some f in F,
for some realization hT, F, Ri, and T is model progressive under f. We then say that C is a
progressive model chain iff either:
a.
b.

for every mi in C, mi is isomorphic to m*, or
there is an ordering of models in C such that for pairs mi, mj (i \ j) in C, mj is a
nearer isomorphs to m* than mi.

Condition (a) reflects the standard idea that, for example, all models of data are entailed
by a theory. Condition (b) is the essential case that drives the contribution of the analysis in
the MET, where models proffered and accepted as confirming models in an inquiry are
appropriately close approximations given the standards of the inquiry. Such a constraint
permits inquiry to be logical and yet not driven by ideals of consistency drawn from
mathematics. Again this is an idealization, in practice a preponderance of closer approximations would suffice.
2.2.2. In order to define the key concept, nearer isomorph in condition (b) we require a
construction that reflects the fact that there is no direct way to order isomorphisms by a
subset relation. We generate an order by first creating a set based on the overlap of
contiguous models as follows:
Let P = {p1,…,pn} of predicates and relational symbols of T. Let vi be an assignment of
elements of mi to P for a model mi of model chain C = hm1,…mni of T, where the nth
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member is the intended model, m*. Let vi and vj (j = i ? 1) be a assignment of elements
of mi and mj in P for all pairs of contiguous models in model chain C of T, that is to say, mi
and mj, are adjacent in the ordering and so constitute a minimal subchain (recall model
chains are ordered in time).
We require a construction that enables such minimal subchains to be ordered by the
subset relation: Let v* be the overlap vi^vj of assignment functions where for a graph of
vi^vj (an ordered n-dimensional assignment of data points to predicates and relations of T),
each element of vi^vj is in both vi and vj or are in a near neighborhood relation. And where
the width of the near neighborhood is defined by current methodological practice in the
field in which T is proposed, another aspect of the pragmatic turn.
The intuition is that v* identifies the elements in a pair of models that are identical, or
close enough to be deemed functionally equivalent in terms of inferences. Since the model
chain C orders the models it contains, we need to be able to order the various function v*
accordingly, that is, construct a sequence hv*1,…,v*ni where each v*i is the overlap of a
pair-wise assignment, to the members of C. Since the v*i are sets we can order them by the
subset relation. Since v*n is the overlap of mn-1, and mn and mn is the intended model, m*,
for each minimal subchain, hmi, mji (j = i ? 1), mj is a nearer isomorph to m* than mi.
2.3. Let hC1,…,Cni be a well ordering of the progressive model chains of TT, such that
for all i,j (i \ j), Cj is a later model chain than Ci. TT is model chain progressive iff
hC1,…,Cni is well ordered in time. That is to say each later model includes and extends the
models antecedent to it in time.
As before, this is an idealization indicating a theory that is uniformly progressive. Much
more complex judgments are required in the face of the vagaries of evidence and instrumentation, and the most that we can expect of a theory is that progress is predominant, that
is, most model chains are mainly progressive.
2.3.1. A key feature that the formalism attempts to capture is consilience, or, increasingly adequate models over time. As is hopefully apparent, the core idea is a theory T with
an intended model. If the intended model is adequately instanced by the evidence, 2 (a),
above, that is, m||- T for some intended model, m, or if a subset of T, k(T) is stable, that is
k(T) satisfies condition 2 (a) then we have prima facie reason to accept T or a portion of T
at this point. The weaker condition is that T or k(T) satisfies condition 2 (b). That is, the
evidentiary base is increasingly adequate, more closely approximating to the intended
model over time. But as we shall see in our brief overview of the history of the periodic
table in the next section, that is at best a preliminary determination based on the available
evidence at a time and the limited application of a theory to the small domain of evidence
that warrants the initial hypothesis that the theory encapsulates.
Historically, as measurements increase and as the range to application broadens, the
theory is modified in a variety of ways. If the initial hypothesis is born out over time, as
new evidence sustains the theoretic model (an event that has occurred rarely, if ever, even
in the most trustworthy scientific endeavors) we may continue to be satisfied with the
theory at a very high level of epistemic adequacy, 2.2.1, (a). But the more likely scenario is
that as additional bodies of evidence are added to the scope of the investigation (in our
terms additional models are available), forming a model chain (2.2). The model chain is
progressive, offering increased evidence of consilience as in 2.2.1, condition (b) indicating
the improvement of the evidentiary basis as it approximates to the intended model of T.
It should be apparent that under the impress of available evidence (models), any theory
might be revised. It is in this sense that the MET is an imaginative metaphor rather than a
historical description, for we assume a stable theory, T, in all of our constructions. It is only
in retrospect that we can pick out the theory that early hypotheses were struggling to
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discover. MET gives the retrospective logic of a successful theory once we have it. This of
course, marks my theory of truth of emerging truth as a metaphysical one. That is, I am
giving the abstract properties of emerging truth without being able to indicate whether
there are any actual instances, and if there are any, which ones they are.
2.3.2. Condition 2.3 above gives the first indication of the crucial epistemic property of
breadth. The ordering of progressive model chains is progressive as well. That is to say the
range of the theory is increasing as more chains of models (more applications of the theory)
are shown to be increasingly adequate. A more profound notion of breadth, which will
yield the epistemic property, depth, requires the addition of reduction relations, to be
discussed immediately below.
3. We now turn our attention to the members of some R in RR. The construction is
based on representing functions, functions that map elements of one theory onto another.
The crucial property of representing functions is, for functions r* in R* for reducing
theory, T*, and reduced theory, T, r* reduces T to T* is equivalent to, for every model m*
of T* there exists a model of m of T such that, for every sentence, s, of T, s is true in m if
and only if r*(s) is true in m*. And similarly for formulas and assignments in m, and
corresponding formulas in m* for T*.
3.1. Representing function can be limited to subsets of T, k(T). This yields the following
core construction.
The members of RR represent T in T* in respect of some subset of T, k(T). Let
hk1(T),…,kn(T)i be an n-tuple of representations of T over time, that is if j [ i, then kj(T) is
a partial representation of T in T* at a time later that ki(T). We say that TT is reduction
progressive iff either,
a.
b.

k(T) is identical to T for all indices, or
the n-tuple is well ordered by the subset relation.

As before, condition (a) represents the best-case scenario, (b) represents a weaker but
still acceptable condition. The intuition behind the construction reflects the historic fact
that reductions (reinterpretation of a theory in terms of the concepts of a higher order, more
abstract theory) rarely capture the entire scope of the reduced theory. A theory is reduction
progressive if more of the reduced theory is represented in the reducing theory of time. As
before, the construction is an idealization, as new aspects of a theory are reduced, frequently earlier reduction need to be reconsidered, so in reality we are faced with determinations based on trends rather than with a univocal picture of success. Examples from
the history of the physical science abound. The classic example of the reduction of the
Boyles-Charles Law via statistical mechanics could not be easily transferred outside of the
realm of its initial application to gases without significant modification (Nagel 1963,
pp. 359ff). Yet the reduction of all sorts of phenomena to physical principles ultimately
resulted in a wealth of physical explanations that shared a common conceptual core in
statistical mechanics, including fluid dynamics, rigid body dynamics, electromagnetism
and ultimately atomic theory.
The intuition here is that more of the theory is being reduced over time and so the
confidence in the reduction is increased. This is typical of the early stages of theoretic
speculation as array of empirical models available confirm more of the abstract theory. The
discussion of triads and the subsequent elaboration of structural models is an example from
the history of the periodic table. Another obvious example is the increase of confirmation
of basic physical laws as more phenomena that satisfied increasingly elaborate deductions
were identified in fields as prima facie distinct as fluid dynamics, electro-magnetism,
chemistry and crystallography. This breadth of scope will be characterized in 5.3.
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3.1.1. We call an n-tuple of theories RC = hT1,…,Tni, a reduction chain, where for
each pair, hTi, Tji, j = i ? 1, there is an ri in Ri such that ri represents Ti in Tj
3.1.2. RC = hT1,…,Tj,…,Tni is a deeper reduction chain than j-tuple
RC* = hT*1,…,T*ji, iff n [ j and for all i \ j there is an ri in Ri such that ri represents
Ti in Ti?1 and similarly for T*i and for all Tk (k B j).
3.2. We call a theory, T, reduction chain progressive iff for an n-tuple of reduction
chains hRC1,…,RCni and for each RCi (i C 1), RCi?1 is a deeper reduction chain than RCi.
The point of 3.2 is to call attention to the fact that there may be more than one chain of
reductions, that is, different aspects of physical reality are independently reduced to some
powerful reducing theory. The best example is atomic theory that although general in its
scope is first applied to gases and then only later is successfully applied to fluids and solids.
The historical phenomena of a deep theory, such as atomic theory, that had as its impetus a
desire to incorporate vast areas of actual and potential empirical knowledge, is one of large
ambitions faced with small advances. Atomic theory expands laterally to apply to the entire
range of chemical reactions, to electrical phenomena and ultimately resulted in the
development of particle physics, which transformed atomic theory in unimaginable ways.
This idea of a theory branching out to include new areas of concern is the focus of the next
series of constructions.
3.2.1. The preceding definition is the central characterization of the notion of theoretic
depth, a measure of the number of higher order theories that reduce T thus affording deeper
explanations through reductions. Theories that have explanations of a more abstract sort,
reductions, give more profound meaning to the phenomena they explain. The increase in
number of reducing theories, the ability to find deeper theoretic support is a key indication
of the epistemic power of the warrants that the theory affords. But there is more at stake
then the mere depth of reduction. For reducing theories in the most successful theoretic
endeavors reach out, unifying bodies of evidence, heretofore seen as distinct. And if, as is
the case in physical science, reducing theories are of broad scope, the increase in confirmatory evidence is enormous, since each chain of theories, each with its own confirming
evidentiary basis, confirms, through reduction, those reducing theories that stand at the
highest points in the scientific structure. That is to say, the entire range of evidence for all
of the reduced theories, confirms the reducing theories themselves. Theories of such depth
and scope support the most entrenched inferences, since challenges to them put the entire
scientific structure into question. We now turn to a characterization of the theoretic breadth
of chains of reductions that are the basis for the power of the reducing theories that give TT
its depth.
3.3. T is a branching reducer iff there is a pair (at least) T? and T* in set of realization
of TT such that there is some r? and r* in R? and R*, respectively, such that r? represents
T? in T and r* represents T* in T and neither T? is represented in T* nor conversely.
We now turn to sequences of realizations, TT1, TT2 etc.
3.3.1 B = hTT1,TT2,…,TTni = hhT1, F1, R1i, hT2, F2, R2i,…,hTn, Fn, Rnii is a reduction branch of TT1 iff T1 is a branching reducer in respect of all Ti and
Tj (i C 2; j C 3 for i,j B n).
Yet again, this is an idealization; in the history of reductions there are often gaps, but to
limit the construction to some Ti would be much too weak and would represent a period of
theoretic conjecture. MET seeks to represent theoretic consolidation, since as we shall we
below, the degree of consolidation is the basic logical element against which counterexamples must be weighed.
3.4. Since each branch, B, is an n-tuple the construction for a progressively branching
reducer is more complex. Construct the set BB of all branches; BB is non-empty and has
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n-elements. We then proceed to ‘count’ the n-order subsets of BB, in the standard way. For
each Bi in BB we construct an indicator function, f, such that for all integers, n, Bi,
f(n) = 1, if Bi is in BB and f(n) = 0 is Bi is not in BB. This gives us the n-tuple,
BB* = h(f(0), f(1),… f(n - 1)i, an index of BB. We say that a branching reducer, T, is a
progressively branching reducer iff the n-tuple BB* is well ordered in time that is, for each
pair if indices, f(i), f(j), i, j (j [ i) Bj is a later branch than Bi, that is, the number of
branching reducers has been increasing in breadth as inquiry persists.
3.4.1. The notion of a progressively branching reducer completes the discussion of the
three key epistemic properties of theoretic inquiry, consilience, breadth and depth (now
interpreted both for empirical explanations and theoretic reductions). This gives us what
we need to arrive at the notion of truth as an emergent property based on a theoretic
structure over time (7.3–7.33), but first some preliminary notions and summative
definitions.
4. Let TTT be an n-tuple hTT1,…,TTni of scientific structures seriously proposed at a
time. Let hhT1,F1,R1i,…,hTn, Fn,Rnii be their respective realizations at a time. We say that
a set of models M, M = {m1, m2,…,mn} is a persistent model set iff
a.
b.

M = hhm1 = hd1,f1i, m2 = hd2,f2i,…,mn = hdn,fnii and for all i, j di = dj, or
M is a model in a set of ordered subsets of TTT, such that the sequence is well
ordered in time by the subset relation.

4.1. M is an ontic set for TTT (cf. 3.1.3), that is, M is a set of models that are putative
ontologies for M in that their common domain persists under reduction relations over time.
4.2. We say that an ontic set O is a favored ontic set iff,
a.
b.
c.

O is the set of intended models of a theory T is the first member of a progressive
reduction chain. (O is thus the ontic set of all of the theories in the chain.)
the members of the reduction chain are themselves reduction progressive.
T is a progressively branching reducer.

4.2.1. Notice that the set consisting of an ontic set and the sets that it generates (the set
of sets under the reduction relation), form a persistent model set.
5. TT is progressive iff:
a.
b.
c.

TT is model chain progressive
TT is model progressive
TT is reduction progressive.

5.1. We call T a progressive reducer iff:
a.
b.

T is reduction chain progressive
T is a progressively branching reducer.

5.2. We say T is a favored reducer, iff:
a.
b.

TT is progressive
T is a progressive reducer.

5.3. T is a most favored reducer if T is a maximally progressive reducer, that is, T is the
nth member of a reduction chain such that for all Ti, (i \ n) Ti is a favored reducer.
(Notice, T is not reduction progressive, since it stands at the head of the longest reduction
chain.)
5.3.1. The set O, of ontic models of T, is thus, a favored ontic set in respect of every Ti
(i \ n) in the reduction chain.
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5.3.2. If T is a most favored reducer, and O is its favored ontic set, O* = {m1,…,mn} of
models mi in O is the ontology of scientific structure TT.
5.3.3. A truth predicate for TT can then be constructed in fairly standard Tarskian as ‘s
is true’ for s in T and T in TT, iff O*||-s where O*, as above, defines the ontological
commitment of TT.
5.3.4. The truth predicate in 5.3.3 mirrors the standard satisfaction relation, and so the
deep intuition of correspondence captured is redeemed. But notice it is impossible to
specify O* in the absence of the process of inquiry. And so the essential difference between
the MET and standard semantic theory remains. Logical semantics, as developed by Alfred
Tarski can assume recursive arithmetic as an available semantics, the basis of logical
theory since the 1920’s. But the truth condition for the various theories T, of TT, that is to
say O*, cannot be ascertained independently of the history of TT, but grows out of the
progressive nature of TT as its intended model captures all of the developments with the
depth of understanding that the concepts (predicates) within TT provides, and as the
relations (generalizations) in TT are proved adequate to the entire range of available
phenomena. Clearly O* may be seen as fanciful, a purely metaphysical definition of truth.
But it has logical substance, for it is the result of a definable procedure and rooted in the
most successful empirical inquiry known to human history, physical chemistry.
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